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LAWSUIT. By Stuart M. Speiser.* Horizon Press, New York, New
York. 1980. Pp. 605. Reviewed by John A. Lynch, Jr.1
It is not surprising that a recognized leader of the plaintiff's
tort bar would author a generally one-sided, preachy defense of
American tort litigation. Stuart M. Speiser, a leading figure in
aviation negligence and products liability litigation and author of
Lawsuit and many useful practice books,1 is not modest in his
claims of the benefits of tort litigation to American society. In
fact, it would probably surprise even the most querulous reader or
reviewer that he would include claims that contemporary tort liti-
gation has thwarted foreign dictatorships, has done more for
America's image abroad than all her foreign aid, has bolstered
local economies where it has been carried on, has breathed life into
the equal protection clause of United States Constitution and,
mirabile dictu, has lowered some insurance rates. Owing to
Speiser's years of practice and experience as a prominent
plaintiff's tort lawyer and his extensive historical research of this
subject, Lawsuit is both an autobiography, in that it includes
several cases litigated by the author, and an historical account of
tort litigation in the United States.
In Lawsuit Speiser divides American tort litigation into two
eras: the period before 1950 and the period after 1950. He con-
trasts the two eras of tort litigation primarily by describing the
leading tort cases and personalities of each one. The injured acci-
dent victim or worker in the United States in the last century and
into the middle of this century generally received inadequate com-
pensation from tort litigation. Obsessive concern for the indus-
trialization of America fostered a keen solicitude for property
rights. As Speiser indicates, not only were America's enterprises
able to employ such legal luminaries as Abraham Lincoln and
Clarence Darrow, but there was also great legislative, executive
and even popular protection of their interests, often at the
* Stuart M. Speiser is a senior partner of Speiser, Krause & Madole, a prominent litiga-
tion firm with offices in New York, Washington, Los Angeles and London.
t A.B., St. Anselm's College, 1971; J.D. & LL.M., George Washington University
School of Law, 1974 & 1978; Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of
Law.
1. Cited by the United States Supreme Court and other courts throughout the country,
eighteen legal textbooks have been authored by Speiser. Some of his best sellers in-
clude: S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, AVIATION TORT LAW (1978); S. SPEISER, RECOVERY
FOR WRONGFUL DEATH (2d ed. 1975); S. SPEISER, ATTORNEYS FEES (1973); S. SPEISER,
THE NEGLIGENCE CASE: RES IPSA LOQUITUR (1972).
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expense of the injury victim, particularly the injured worker.
2
Speiser amply demonstrates that tort litigation under the ancien
rigime often produced outrageous results. 3 He also blames the
generally pathetic and incompetent class of lawyers who repre-
sented tort plaintiffs. These plaintiffs' lawyers were not above
chasing ambulances, buying testimony, settling cases for
nuisance value amounts and charging clients a fifty percent con-
tingency fee. 4 Because tort practice at that time was considered an
unsavory profession, many reputable lawyers found it unworthy
of their talents.
In the period since 1950, injury claimants have received
increasingly adequate compensation. Speiser attributes the suc-
cess in recoveries by personal injury claimants in this latter era to
the "trinity of torts" (a catch-phrase that nearly makes one
wince), which includes: the right to trial by jury in most civil
cases, contingent fee retainer agreements and the development
after the late 1940's of a class of "entrepreneur lawyers." It is
clearly the last element of the trinity, the rise of lawyers willing to
advance considerable amounts of money to make sophisticated
and scientific cases of liability and damages on behalf of plaintiffs,
that has been most critical in creating a climate where plaintiffs
can recover large verdicts. Such large verdicts, according to
Speiser, have brought great benefits to America and to the world.
2. A case not discussed by Speiser, Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 69 N.H. 257, 44 A. 809
(1898), amply demonstrates a preoccupation with protection of property rights. In
Buch, the plaintiff, an eight-year-old boy who could not speak or understand English,
was injured when his arm was caught in machinery in the defendant's mill. The plain-
tiff had been ordered-an order he could not understand-out of the defendant's mill
prior to his injury. It was no surprise that a nineteenth century tribunal in a leading
textile manufacturing jurisdiction would find no liability to a trespasser under the
circumstances. What was shocking was the court's obiter dicta: "If, then, the defen-
dant's machinery was injured by the plaintiff's act in putting his hand in the gearing,
he is liable to them for the damages in an action of trespass, and to nominal damages
for the wrongful entry." Id. at 262, 44 A. at 811.
3. In a 1909 fire at Chicago's Iroquois Theatre, which was advertised as "absolutely
fireproof," 602 persons perished. Although the theatre's owners and builders had vio-
lated numerous safety laws and ordinances, the largest recoveries were settlements
of a few dozen civil suits for $750.00 per death. In 1911, 145 employees of the Triangle
Shirtwaist factory, a New York City sweatshop, died in a fire when trapped by locked
exit doors. After an unsuccessful lawsuit against the factory owners, death claims
against the building owners were settled for $75.00 each. LAWSUIT at 133-38.
4. Regrettably, Speiser enters a plea of self-defense for these rascals:
The carly plaintiffs' lawyers were faced with the problem of overcoming the
handiwork of the claims department if they were to have any chance to win
the case. The plaintiffs had no claims department; so the dirty work had to
be done by their lawyers, who had no one else to buy up their own witnesses
or create evidence. Some plaintiffs' lawyers became pretty good at this
game, which started at a time when law practice was being deprofes-
sionalized in most states.
Id at 139.
Laying the groundwork for his strident celebration of present
day negligence litigation, Speiser also describes the development
of substantive defenses and court practices of early industrial
America in dark conspirational terms:
[Tihe captains of industry knew that jurors in accident
cases would probably be more sympathetic to injured peo-
ple than to big business; so something had to be done to
prevent injuries from impeding industrial progress by
compensating its victims too freely. The defense lawyers
and judges who were persuaded by these arguments were
equal to the task. They erected an obstacle course
designed to wear down or eliminate all but the hardiest
accident claimants and their lawyers.5
Such defenses included assumption of risk and contributory negli-
gence, which remain with us today to some degree, and the fellow-
servant rule. These defenses offered by industry were readily
accepted by the American courts and flourished in a society com-
mitted to industrial expansion at the expense of the working class.
These defenses, which admittedly were harshly applied in
industrial accident cases in this century, were the necessary foils
of a defendant in a system where liability was based on fault. It
might cogently be argued that the best way of eliminating the
harsh consequences of these defenses would be to abandon fault
as a basis of liability and recovery. This was achieved early in this
century by the enactment of workmen's compensation statutes.6
To a limited degree, some jurisdictions have further embraced the
concept of liability or recovery without fault in so-called
"no-fault" laws. 7
Speiser does not advocate elimination of liability based on
fault except in cases involving relatively small amounts of
money." He contends that the benefits paid under a program such
5. Id. at 124.
6. As stated in the preamble of the original Maryland workmen's compensation statute:
Whereas, The common law system governing the remedy of workmen
against employers for injuries received in extra-hazardous work is inconsis-
tent with modern industrial conditions; and injuries in such work, formerly
occasional, have now become frequent and inevitable.
Now, Therefore, the State of Maryland, exercising herein its police and
sovereign power, declares that all phases of extra-hazardous employments
be, and they are hereby withdrawn from private controversy, and sure and
certain relief for workmen injured in extra-hazardous employments and their
families and dependents are hereby provided for, regardless of questions of
fault and to the exclusion of every other remedy, except as provided in this
Act.
Law of April 16, 1914, ch. 800, 1914 Md. Laws 1429.
7. An example of such laws may be seen at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 34A (West
Supp. 1981).
8. LAWSUIT at 587.
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as workmen's compensation are inherently small because they are
dependent on the lobbying power of organized labor? Speiser
favors the system that bases liability on fault, despite its draw-
backs, because that system, under the guidance of entrepreneur-
lawyers, has yielded ever-larger recoveries for plaintiffs. Unlike
workmen's compensation, the contingent fee is not measured in
terms of actual time spent on settling cases or work done.
Speiser's justification of contingent fees is in fact quite
defensive:
It is easy for journalists and the public to form a "fat cat"
image of the plaintiff's contingency fee lawyer, since no
previous author has described the obstacles to be over-
come and the facilities that must be maintained to serve
the public. You will not find any plaintiff's lawyers in
Fortune's list of millionaires.1°
Part of Speiser's mission is to set out for the public the "money
dynamics," or practical economics, of tort litigation. Such litiga-
tion, as maintained by a scientific entrepreneur-lawyer such as
Speiser, is expensive. For example, plaintiffs' lawyers advanced
more than one million dollars in costs for their clients in litigation
related to the 1974 crash of a Turkish Airlines DC-10 near Paris,
France. Speiser states that his own firm often has paid out
between five and ten thousand dollars to investigate a case to
determine whether or not to take it. Such preliminary investiga-
tion, of course, protects the plaintiff's lawyer from the down side
of the contingent fee system, the chance that he will recover
nothing after maintaining expensive protracted litigation. Speiser
notes that the capital for the costly battles with insurers and cor-
porations comes only from the after-tax fruits of previous vic-
tories. Although Speiser does not say so explicitly, it is clear that
for the tort lawyer the easy pickings in quickly settled cases are
necessary to subsidize ground-breaking struggles where the plain-
tiff's right to recover at the outset is not clear:
[T]he plaintiffs do not buy a fixed number of hours from
us - they could not afford to do so. What they are inter-
ested in is a favorable result, and if we achieve that in one
case with a thousand hours work and in another case with
2000 hours work, it makes no difference to the clients."
9. The Maryland workmen's compensation program, in cases of benefits for permanent
total disability, results in a loss of at least one-third of an injured employee's pre-tax
income. While such compensation is essentially a wage supplement, the employer is
responsible for other items related to a worker's injuries such as medical or funeral
expenses. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, §§ 36 & 37 (1979). Attorneys' fees for services in
representing a claimant must be approved by the Workmen's Compensation Commis-
sion. Id § 57.
10. LAWSUIT at 572.
11. Id at 592.
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A lawyer speaking from a different perspective has contended
that the need to justify a contingent fee in a case that should be
settled quickly has caused some lawyers to drag out settlement
negotiations, aggravating court backlogs. 12
The system that Speiser so stoutly defends is, in essence, a
slot machine into which the plaintiff's lawyer feeds successive
clients. While such litigation entails procedural risks for plaintiffs
even in the most meritorious cases, the lawyer as able and as dili-
gent as Speiser will come out ahead because of the ultimate possi-
bility, perhaps even probability, that a jury will mulct a carefully
selected deep pocket defendant. 3
It is perhaps appropriate that Speiser in his role as a consum-
mate advocate is unhampered by objectivity in describing tort liti-
gation. Speiser points out that the deposition, when used by the
defendants against his client, is one of the many "attrition tactics
used by a wealthy litigant against a weaker one." 14 Describing his
own use of a deposition, Speiser lauds discovery, particularly the
deposition, as that which takes a lot of guesswork and gamesman-
ship out of the trial.15 One of the evils of pre-1950 tort litigation,
according to Speiser, was that "[tjhe powerful defense counsel and
the authoritative figure of the judge warned the jurors they could
not indulge their natural sympathies. ' '1e Speiser makes no sugges-
tion that the rigors of contributory negligence were ameliorated,
in some instances, by jury verdicts that compromised liability and
12. Casey, Thoughts on Revitalization of Casualty Litigation, 1979 INS. L.J. 677, 680.
Mr. Casey suggests that plaintiffs in negligence cases be notified of settlement offers
by insurance companies at the time such offers are made. While such a practice might
speed up the settlement process, it would seemingly be a questionable contact with
an opposing represented party. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR
7-104 (A)(1).
13. It is clear that Speiser is not really very interested in all of the benefits of the jury
system if the opportunity for gain is limited, as he states:
I am in favor of experiments with arbitration of claims up to $50,000, like
those which are now conducted in three federal district courts. It would be
wonderful if we could maintain the right to a jury trial in every legitimate
claim, but inflation and the realities of court budgets make it difficult to pro-
vide this service in smaller cases.
LAWSUIT at 597.
14. Id. at 30.
15. Id at 46. Furthermore, Speiser contends that the use of depositions aids in the settle-
ment of a large number of cases before they go to trial. He states that "[wihen the op-
posing lawyers know the strengths and weaknesses of each other's cases, the stage is
set for productive settlement discussions, and the expense and uncertainty of trial
can often be avoided." Id
16. Id at 126. Of course, juries today are admonished not to decide cases on the basis of
sympathy for the litigants. E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR, 2 FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE
AND INSTRUCTIONS § 71.02 (3d ed. 1977).
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damages.17 In Speiser's parochial view, anything that might pre-
vent or limit a plaintiff's recovery, whether it be sovereign immu-
nity, wrongful death statutes or limitation of tort plaintiffs' re-
covery to postjudgment interest, is a "rotten legal door" which
must be noisily kicked in by "a doughty band of entrepreneur-
lawyers."18
Whether the role of the entrepreneur-lawyer is "Adam
Smith's free enterprise capitalism in its purest form,"1 9 as Speiser
suggests, or an exploitation of jury sympathies at great social
cost, 0 Speiser's description of the development of this class of
lawyers, as exemplified by his cases and those of his associates, is
worth the reader's endurance of his turgid polemics. Aviation neg-
ligence was a wide-open field when Speiser stepped in in 1950. In
1956, when two commercial airliners collided over the Grand Can-
yon and then crashed killing a total of 128 persons, any plaintiff in
a negligence action against the airlines was confronted with seri-
ous attitudinal problems of potential jurors. At that time, many
Americans had never flown and tended to regard accidents as an
inherent hazard of flying rather than the product of negligence.
Undoubtedly, experienced, uniformed airline captains made
highly credible defendants' witnesses. Speiser and his cohorts
overcame the defendants' financial advantages with then unprece-
17. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.21, at 328-31 (2d ed. 1977).
18. LAWSUIT at 581. Even the humble law review article is an archangel's sword or an in-
strumentality of great wickedness, depending upon whether it shares Speiser's world
view. Speiser emphasizes the important role of law review articles in overcoming
"rotten legal doors that need to be kicked in." Id. at 579. Speaking of writers who
criticize aspects of tort litigation from a different perspective, Speiser says: "It
seems that journalists (and sometimes law professors) are unconcerned about the
damage that they might do by turning the success of the entrepreneur-lawyers
against them, claiming that it has now become easy to prove liability and that ver-
dicts are too high." Id. at 574.
19. Id. at 344.
20. In an address delivered before the New York State Bar Association on January 17,
1899, Mr. Justice Holmes saw a paradoxical benefit in the role played by juries in
litigation:
I confess that in my experience I have not found juries specially inspired for
the discovery of truth.... I have not found them freer from prejudice than
an ordinary judge would be. Indeed one reason why I believe in our practice
of leaving questions of negligence to them is what is precisely one of their
gravest defects from the point of view of their theoretical function: that they
will introduce into their verdict a certain amount - a very large amount, so
far as I have observed - of popular prejudice, and thus keep the administra-
tion of the law in accord with the wishes and feelings of the community.
Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 459-60 (1899).
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dented nationwide coordinated discovery among the plaintiffs.21
Such an effort was costly and could be justified only by recovery
of large plaintiffs' verdicts. Getting a jury to return such verdicts
required more than an appeal to their sympathies rehearsed on the
way to the courthouse.
The Grand Canyon disaster case, which was tried in Los
Angeles in 1958 by Speiser, Melvin Belli and others for the plain-
tiffs, required a great deal of testimony about probable lost wages
and economic losses. In discussing later aircraft negligence and
products liability cases, Speiser describes the increasingly sophis-
ticated use by the plaintiffs' bar of blackboards, charts, video-
tapes and economists in the extremely difficult task of valuing
human life and suffering. The discussion of these cases provides
an effective reminder, particularly to aspiring lawyers, that cases
are won largely on the basis of facts, not books or legal arguments.
For this reviewer, the most useful aspect of Lawsuit is the
first chapter, an 118-page description of Ralph Nader's suit
against General Motors in a New York state court for invasion of
privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress and improper
interference with advantageous economic relations. This suit was
based on alleged snooping into Nader's private life at General
Motor's behest in the wake of his publication of Unsafe at Any
Speed and his testimony about automobile safety before the Sen-
ate Subcommittee on Executive Reorganization in 1966. Shock-
ingly, such causes of action were as novel in the United States in
the late 1960's as aircraft negligence had been ten years earlier.
Speiser's description of his gathering of the elements of plead-
ing from favorable precedent in jurisdictions other than New York
to fashion a cause of action, toppling old but established prece-
dent, constitutes an excellent description for the beginning stu-
dent of how pleading changes reflect the development of the com-
mon law. Many of the devices and much of the terminology of a
civil lawsuit deposition, demurrer, request for admission, sum-
mary judgment, interlocutory appeal - about which it is extra-
ordinarily difficult to teach first year students in the abstract -
come very much to life when discussed by Speiser in the context of
Nader's suit. The lengthy first chapter would be an excellent
teaching aid in a Civil Procedure course.
Not the least instructive fact about the Nader lawsuit was
that, after much pretrial maneuvering, the case was settled. The
21. A recent news report concerning the litigation against Procter and Gamble Co.
related to its Rely tampons suggests that the coordination of discovery among plain-
tiffs will reduce the defendants' litigation costs because they "would have to spend
only a tiny fraction of the time they otherwise might have to spend in giving and tak-
ing depositions." Dodosh, Lawyers Urge Cost Sharing In Pursuing Tampon Suits,
Wall St. J., Dec. 11, 1980, at 29, col. 4.
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contingent fee of $115,000 amounted to less than $30 per hour for
Speiser and his associates. Speiser effused that Nader used the
proceeds of the litigation "to assure the continuity of his opera-
tions' and to build the permanent staff needed to fight on so many
consumer fronts. 22 Speiser provides an excellent model descrip-
tion of a settlement as a victory. That alone is an important contri-
bution to the efficient administration of justice.
In its tone, in many instances, Lawsuit is not far removed
from vanity press. Speiser spends a substantial amount of time
describing such things as his law offices and the pulchritude of his
partner's wife. There is a great deal of undoubtedly unintentional
humor in Speiser's giddy description of a building constructed for
a Florida tort firm as a "Taj Mahal of torts." He describes further:
"The new.., building was like a vision of Camelot to us. It was a
symbol of the tort lawyers' dream come true. "23
As if he had not done enough pontificating throughout,
Speiser, in his last chapter, provides the reader with an "Inter-
view With a Tort Lawyer." Therein he reiterates his defense of the
contingent fee tort litigation system through his answers to such
difficult questions as: "So you are not a fat cat? '24
Speiser makes his case for the present system of tort litiga-
tion almost too strenuously to be taken seriously. For the reader
who is willing to suffer such nonsense as descriptions of how tort
litigation improves our image abroad and keeps many stenogra-
phers and hotels busy, Lawsuit provides a very interesting look
inside civil litigation.
22. LAWSUIT at 110. Some might contend that Nader, on the way to the Crusade, became
infected with hubris, pointing to his participation in 1977 in the formation of Fight to
Advance the Nation's Sports (FANS). This organization was designed to ensure
sports fans, inter alia, "that hot dogs were warmer than beer." Nader Success orEx-
cess, TIME, Nov. 14, 1977, at 76. Fortunately, Speiser does not trace the proceeds of
the suit against General Motors to FANS.
23. LAWSUIT at 296.
24. Id at 594.
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